Identifying meaningful clusters in malware data by de Amorim, Renato Cordeiro & Ruiz, Carlos David Lopez
Identifying meaningful clusters in malware data
Renato Cordeiro de Amorima,∗, Carlos David Lopez Ruiza
aSchool of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park CO4 3SQ, UK.
Abstract
Finding meaningful clusters in drive-by-download malware data is a particularly difficult task. Malware data tends
to contain overlapping clusters with wide variations of cardinality. This happens because there can be considerable
similarity between malware samples (some are even said to belong to the same family), and these tend to appear in
bursts. Clustering algorithms are usually applied to normalised data sets. However, the process of normalisation aims
at setting features with different range values to have a similar contribution to the clustering. It does not favour more
meaningful features over those that are less meaningful, an effect one should perhaps expect of the data pre-processing
stage.
In this paper we introduce a method to deal precisely with the problem above. This is an iterative data pre-processing
method capable of aiding to increase the separation between clusters. It does so by calculating the within-cluster
degree of relevance of each feature, and then it uses these as a data rescaling factor. By repeating this until convergence
our malware data was separated in clear clusters, leading to a higher average silhouette width.
Keywords: feature rescaling, drive-by-download malware, clustering.
1. Introduction
The term malware is used to describe malicious soft-
ware, which has been designed with the specific pur-
pose of exploiting vulnerabilities in computer systems.
In general, any given malware aims at compromising
such systems. Malware can be further divided into
non-exclusive categories such as trojan, virus, adware,
worms, etc. Malware development may have had an in-
nocent start, but there are now multiple examples sug-
gesting this is a multi-million business sometimes as-
sociated to organised crime [1, 2, 3, 4]. Malware has
also been used in acts of sabotage, and may even have
political motivations [5].
Here, we are interested in clustering malware data.
That is, identifying k homogeneous groups (ie. clusters)
of malware in a given data set — without the need for
labelled samples for an algorithm to learn from. Once
one is able to say that a new malware sample should
be assigned to a cluster containing homogeneous mal-
ware samples (for a longer discussion of what a cluster
is, see [6]) it becomes easier to create defence mecha-
nisms. Clustering algorithms (for complete reviews, see
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[7, 8] and references therein) can be usually divided in
two groups: partitional and hierarchical. The latter in-
cludes algorithms able to produce a clustering as well
as information regarding the relationships that exist be-
tween clusters (this information can be represented with
the help of a dendrogram). Partitional clustering iden-
tify k disjoint clusters in a given data set, so that each
object (a malware sample, in our case) in the data set is
assigned to a single cluster. Although hierarchical algo-
rithms produce information one would usually associate
with families (ie. a tree), it comes with a computational
cost. In 2018 alone, 246,002,762 new malware variants
were found [9]. Hence, we see partitional clustering as
a more realistic approach for the real-world.
There are various examples of clustering algorithms
applied to malware data in the literature (for instance,
[10, 11, 12] and references therein). However, these ap-
ply classical normalisation to the data sets (for details,
see Section 3). This type of normalisation (eg. z-score,
range normalisation, unit length, etc.) aims at putting
all features used to describe an object at the same level.
It does not favour more meaningful features over those
that are less meaningful. There is considerable similar-
ity between malware samples (at times some are even
said to belong to the same family). Hence, it is reason-
able to expect that there will be a considerable amount
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of overlap between clusters. Also, malware samples
have a tendency to be released in bursts with a skewed
distribution [13]. This scenario makes clustering partic-
ularly difficult.
In this paper we introduce a novel method to deal
with the problem described above. Our method is capa-
ble of increasing the separation between clusters during
the data pre-processing stage. It does so by calculating
the within-cluster degree of relevance of each feature
in a given data set, and using this as a rescaling factor.
By iterating this process our method increases the qual-
ity of malware clusterings, as measured by the average
silhouette index [14]. We apply our method to drive-
by-download malware data. This referrers to malware
delivered to client systems that browse resources on the
web, usually via http. This is a very timely issue given
that in 2019 Symantec has found one in ten unique re-
source locators (urls) to be malicious [9].
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 discusses the clustering algorithms that are di-
rectly relevant to our research, as well as a method to
measure how good a clustering is. Section 3 briefly ex-
plains the classical normalisation algorithms used in the
pre-processing stage. Section 4 explains our method, to-
gether with its mathematical motivation. Sections 5 and
6 explain our process of data gathering, our method-
ology, and the results we have obtained. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 presents our conclusions, and indications of fu-
ture work.
2. Related work
Given our objective, the work we discuss in this sec-
tion relates to clustering algorithms one could use to
cluster malware samples. Partitional clustering algo-
rithms aim at identifying a set S = {S 1, S 2, ..., S k} so
that each S l ∈ S contains homogeneous objects, and
∀(S l, S j ∈ S ), l , j ⇐⇒ S l ∩ S j = ∅. K-means [15]
is arguably the most popular such algorithm [16, 17].
Given a data set X containing n objects, each described
over d features, k-means minimises the within-cluster
distance
W(S ,Z) =
k∑
l=1
∑
xi∈S l
d∑
v=1
(xiv − zlv)2, (1)
where zl ∈ Z is the centroid of cluster S l ∈ S , that is, the
d-dimensional point with the lowest sum of distances to
all objects in S l. We defined zl as a point to make it clear
that it may or may not belong to X. The k-means algo-
rithm iteratively minimises (1) with three simple steps:
1. Select k objects from X uniformly at random, and
use their values to initialise z1, z2, ..., zk.
2. Assign each xi ∈ X to the cluster S l represented by
the centroid zl that is the nearest to xi.
3. Update each zl ∈ Z to the centre of S l.
The k-means criterion (1) applies the Euclidean squared
distance. Hence, the centre of a cluster S l is the
component-wise mean of its objects, that is zlv =
|S l|−1 ∑xi∈S l xiv for v = 1, 2, ..., d.
As popular as k-means may be, it does have known
weaknesses. The most relevant in this paper are: (i) the
final clustering depends heavily on the initial set of cen-
troids, which are usually found at random. Suboptimal
initial centroids are likely to lead the algorithm to a lo-
cal minima solution; (ii) k-means requires the number of
clusters, k, to be known beforehand; (iii) all features are
treated as if they were equally relevant, which is rather
unlikely in real-world data sets.
There has been a considerable research effort to ad-
dress the weaknesses above. For instance, k-means++
[18] selects one object xi ∈ X uniformly at random, and
then copies its values to the first centroid z1. All other
initial centroids are selected following a weighted prob-
ability that is proportional to the distances between ob-
jects and their nearest centroid.
1. Set l = 1. Select an object from X uniformly at
random and copy its values to zl.
2. Increment l by one. Select an object x j ∈ X at ran-
dom, with probability D(x j)
2∑
xi∈X D(xi)
2 and copy its val-
ues to zl, setting Z = Z ∪ {zl}.
3. Repeat the steps above until l = k.
4. Run k-means using each zl ∈ Z as an initial cen-
troid.
In the algorithm above D(xi) is the distance between
xi ∈ X and its nearest centroid zl ∈ Z. Experiments
show that k-means++ has a faster convergence to a
lower criterion output (1) than the traditional k-means
algorithm [18]. This algorithm has enjoyed consider-
able popularity, and it is now the default k-means option
in MATLAB [19] and scikit-learn [20].
The intelligent k-means algorithm (ik-means) [7] ad-
dresses both weaknesses (i) and (ii) by identifying good
initial centroids for k-means as well as the number
of clusters in X. This algorithm iteratively identifies
anomalous clusters, afterwards the centroids of these
anomalous clusters are then used as initial centroids for
k-means. In this, k is set to the number of anomalous
clusters in X.
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1. Set c to the centre of X, and Z′ = ∅. Identify xt ∈
X, the object that is the furthest from c.
2. Apply k-means to the data set using xt and c as
initial centroids, but do not allow c to move in the
cluster update step. This will lead to clusters S t
and S c with centroids zt and c, respectively.
3. If |S t | ≥ θ, set Z′ = Z′ ∪ {zt}. In any case, remove
each xi ∈ S t from X.
4. If |X| > 0 go to Step 1. Otherwise run k-means by
setting k = |Z′|, and using each zl ∈ Z′ as an initial
centroid.
In the above θ is a user-defined parameter that helps to
avoid small clusters in S , should this be of interest to the
user. If the value of k is known one can sort the elements
of Z′ by the cardinality of their initial clusters (ie. their
value of |S t | in Step four), and keep only the k elements
of Z′ with the highest cardinality (this would happen
between Steps three and four). Another approach would
be to select the k elements of Z′ in the order they were
found. This way they would be the k most anomalous
initial centroids.
We can see that ik-means identifies each centroid zt ∈
Z′, and related cluster S t by iteratively minimising
P(S ,Z) =
∑
xi∈S t
d∑
v=1
(xiv − ztv)2 +
∑
x j∈S c
d∑
v=1
(x jv − cv)2, (2)
where c is the component-wise mean of X.
In order to address all three weaknesses (i), (ii) and
(iii), we introduced the intelligent Minkowski weighted
k-means (imwk-means) [21]. This extends ik-means
by following the intuitive idea that a given feature v
may have different degrees of relevance at each cluster
S l ∈ S . We model this behaviour by introducing wlv, the
weight of feature v at cluster S l. The higher wlv is, the
higher the contribution of v at cluster S l is to the cluster-
ing. First, we define the weighted Minkowski distance
between xi and zl as
d(xi, zl) =
d∑
v=1
wplv|xiv − zlv|p. (3)
The above is in fact the pth power of the Minkowski
distance, which is analogous to the use of the Euclidean
squared distance in k-means. This approach saves the
computational effort of calculating pth roots, and does
not change the clusterings produced by the algorithm.
The imwk-means algorithm minimises
W(S ,Z,W) =
k∑
l=1
∑
xi∈S l
d∑
v=1
wplv|xiv − zlv|p (4)
subject to
S l ∩ S j = ∅ for l, j = 1, 2, ..., k and l , j;
wlv ≥ 0 for l = 1, 2, ..., k and v = 1, 2, ..., d;∑d
v=1 wlv = 1 for l = 1, 2, ..., k;
p ≥ 1.
(5)
Leading to
wlv =
 d∑
u=1
[
Dlv
Dlu
]1/(p−1)
−1
, (6)
where Dlv is the dispersion of feature v at cluster S l,
given by
∑
xi∈S l |xiv − zlv|p. We usually add a small con-
stant to each dispersion (0.001, say) to avoid a division
by zero in (6) when v perfectly discriminates S l (ie. for
all xi ∈ S l, xiv has the same value). The imwk-means
algorithm can be described as follows.
1. Set c to be the Minkowski centre of X, X′ to be a
copy of X, and each wlv = d−1.
2. Find the object xt ∈ X′ that is the farthest from c
using (3), and copy its values to zt.
3. Assign each xi ∈ X′ to either S t or S c, depending
on which centroid is the nearest to xi (zt or c) as per
(3). If this step does not change either S t or S c, go
to Step 6.
4. Update zt to the Minkowski centre of its cluster S t.
Update each wlv as per (6). Go back to Step 3.
5. If |S t | ≥ θ, add zt to Z and w to W. In any case,
remove all objects xi ∈ S t from X′. If |X′| > 0 go
to Step 2.
6. Assign each xi ∈ X to the cluster S l whose centroid
zl is the nearest to xi as per (3). If this step produces
no change to to any S l ∈ S , stop.
7. Update each zl ∈ Z to the Minkowski centre of its
cluster S l. Update each wlv as per (6). Go back to
Step 6.
The Minkowsi centre of a feature v at cluster S l
with an exponent p is the value µ leading to the low-
est γ(p) =
∑
xi∈S l |xiv − µ|p. Notice γ(p) is a convex
function. Hence, one can approximate its minimum by
setting µ = |S l|−1 ∑xi∈S l xiv, and then keep moving µ by
a small number (0.0001, say) to the side that minimises
γ(p).
If one knows how many clusters a data set has, we can
re-state step 5 as “Add zt to Z and w to W. Remove all
objects xi ∈ S t from X′. If |X′| > 0 go to Step 2”. This
would require a new step between 5 and 6: “Keep in Z
and W only the elements related to the k clusters with
the highest cardinality.”, which is the approach used in
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the original paper (see [21]). Of course, very much like
in ik-means it is also possible to remove all but the first
k tentative centroids from Z.
A suitable Minkowski exponent p can be found using
a consensus clustering approach [22]. This requires one
to run imwk-means with values of p from 1.1 to 5.0 in
steps of 0.1, leading to 40 clusterings. The chosen p is
that of the clustering with the highest average similarity
to all other 39 clusterings, usually measured using the
Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [23]. Given two clusterings
S = {S 1, S 2, ..., S k} and U = {U1,U2, ...,Ur}, the ARI is
defined as
ARI(S ,U) =
∑
i j
(
ni j
2
)
−
[∑
i
(
ai
2
)∑
j
(
b j
2
)]
/
(
n
2
)
1
2 [
∑
i
(
ai
2
)
+
∑
j
(
b j
2
)
] − [∑i (ai2)∑ j (b j2 )]/(n2) ,
(7)
where ni j = |S i∩U j|, ai = ∑rj=1 |S i∩U j|, b j = ∑ki=1 |S i∩
U j|. The ARI is corrected for chance.
As well as being able to cluster a data set, one must
be able to decide whether a given clustering represents
the actual structure of the data set without the use of la-
bels. Clustering validity indices (CVIs) are usually used
for this purpose. There is no clear evidence in the litera-
ture showing a particular CVI to be the best in all cases,
however, the average Silhouette width [14] usually per-
forms well [24].
For a given xi ∈ S l, let a(xi) =
1
|S l |−1
∑
x j∈S l\{xi}
∑d
v=1(xiv − x jv)2. That is, a(xi)
is the average distance between xi and all other
objects in its cluster. A low a(xi) indicates the
suitability of the assignment of xi to S l. Let
b(xi) = min
S t,S l
1
|S t |
∑
x j∈S t
∑d
v=1(xiv − x jv)2. That is,
b(xi) is the average distance between xi and the ob-
jects of its closest neighbouring cluster. A high b(xi)
indicates the unsuitability of assigning xi to the closest
cluster to S l. The silhouette index of xi is given by
s(xi) =
b(xi) − a(xi)
max{a(xi), b(xi)} . (8)
Clearly, −1 ≤ s(xi) ≤ 1. A s(xi) close to one indi-
cates xi is closer to the other objects in its cluster than
to objects in other clusters. We can expand this measure
to deal with all xi ∈ X, that is 1n
∑
xi∈X s(xi).
3. Classical data normalisation
Often, data sets contain features with different vari-
ances. Features with a higher variance will have a
higher average distance than features with a lower vari-
ance. Hence, the former will have a higher contribu-
tion to the clustering than the latter. This common issue
highlights the importance of data pre-processing. In this
paper, we normalise our data set (for details on the data
set itself see Section 5) using
x′iv =
xiv − x¯v
max(xv) − min(xv) , (9)
where x¯v = 1n
∑
xi∈X xiv, the average of feature v over all
objects in X. The z-score is also a popular choice in this
scenario, it is given by
x′iv =
xiv − x¯v
σv
,
where σv is the standard deviation of v over all objects
in X. We favoured range normalisation (9) over the z-
score because the latter is biased towards features fol-
lowing a unimodal distribution. This is perhaps easier
to explain with an example. Let the features v1 and v2
be unimodal and multimodal, respectively. The stan-
dard deviation of v2 will be higher than that of v1, thus,
the z-score of v1 will be higher than that of v2. Thus, v1
will have a higher contribution to the clustering than v2.
However, in clustering we would be more interested in
the clusters’ information in v2.
Another interesting characteristic of (9) is that if v is
a binary feature, then max(xv) − min(xv) = 1. Hence,
the standardised value x′iv is just xiv − x¯v. Note that x¯v is
in fact the frequency of v in the data set X. The higher
the frequency of v the lower the standardised value x′iv,
and the lower is its contribution to the clustering. This is
well-aligned with intuition, a feature that is commonly
present (ie. frequent) is less likely to be discriminative.
4. Iterative cluster-dependent feature rescaling
The normalisation discussed in Section 3 sets all fea-
tures of a given data set to have about the same contri-
bution to the clustering. This can also be seen as a dis-
advantage because it means that features with a higher
relevance are set to have the same contribution to the
clustering as features with a lower relevance. Intuition
indicates that features with a higher relevance to the
clustering should have a higher contribution. In fact,
we can go even further. A given feature v may have dif-
ferent degrees of relevance at each cluster S k ∈ S , and
this should be taken into account during the clustering
task.
We can interpret wlv in the distance measure used in
imwk-means (3) as the degree of relevance of feature v
at cluster S l. Such assertion requires further analysis of
imwk-means. This algorithms aims to produce a weight
wlv for l = 1, 2, ..., k and v = 1, 2, ..., d, minimising (4)
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subject to the conditions in (5). Notice that the disper-
sion of v at cluster S l is given by
Dlv =
∑
xi∈S l
|xiv − zlv|p,
allowing us to re-write (4) as
P(U,Z,W) =
d∑
v=1
k∑
l=1
wplvDlv.
The Lagrangian function of the above is
L(W, λ) =
d∑
v=1
wplvDlv + λ
1 − d∑
v=1
wlv
 .
Allowing us to equate its two partial derivatives to zero.
∂L
∂wlv
= pwp−1lv Dlv − λ = 0, (10)
∂L
∂λ
= 1 −
d∑
v=1
wlv = 0. (11)
We can re-arrange (10) to
wlv =
(
λ
pDlv
) 1
p−1
, (12)
and substitute (12) into (11)
d∑
v=1
(
λ
pDlv
) 1
p−1
= 1.
The above leads to
(λ)
1
p−1 =
1∑d
v=1
(
1
pDlv
) 1
p−1
,
and
wlv =
 d∑
u=1
[
Dlv
Dlu
]1/(p−1)
−1
.
The weights calculated as per the above Equation min-
imise (4) by modelling the within-cluster degree of rel-
evance of each feature. This is quite interesting because
it allows us to go a step beyond the normalisation de-
scribed in Section (3) by using these weights as feature
rescaling factors. This is quite unusual because each
feature v = 1, 2, ..., d will have k factors, but it is fine
because these are the weights minimising the clustering
criteria (4).
Given a set of weights calculated as per (6), we can
re-scale a data set X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} that has been nor-
malised (see Section 3) using
x′iv = wlvxiv for i = 1, 2, ..., n, and v = 1, 2, ..., d, (13)
where xi ∈ S l. In other words, the rescaling factor ap-
plied to xiv depends on both: (i) feature v; (ii) the cluster
xi belongs to.
The method we introduce in this paper also has
another novelty. In the first step of imwk-means there is
no data transformation that separates clusters, and each
wlv is set to d−1. While this seems sensible as a starting
point to minimise (4), it also means this starting point
is suboptimal. To address this, the main part of our
method iterates between generating clusterings with
imwk-means and rescaling the data set using (13). This
way, at each iteration imwk-means starts from a better
position. Given that
∑d
v=1 wlv = 1 for l = 1, 2, ..., k, each
time the data set is rescaled the values of its entries
are lowered. To avoid computational issues related to
dealing with very small numbers, we also normalise the
data set using (9) between each of these main iterations.
Iterative cluster-dependent feature rescaling (icdfr):
1. For each value of p from 1.1 to 5.0 in steps of 0.1,
generate a clustering and a set of weights using
imwk-means.
2. Calculate the similarity between each pair of clus-
terings. This similarity can be calculated using
the Adjusted Rand Index. Select as optimal p that
which is associated to the clustering with the high-
est average similarity to all other clusterings.
3. Rescale the data set using the weights generated
with the optimal p and (13).
4. Normalise the data set using (9).
5. Apply imwk-means to the new data set with the op-
timal p. This will update the weights as well as
the clustering. Unless a pre-determined number of
iterations has been reached (or the algorithm has
converged), go to Step 3.
In the above, steps one and two relate to a consensus
approach that has been shown to find suitable values for
the Minkowski exponent p [22]. Regarding the number
of iterations in Step five, we experimented with 100 al-
though the algorithm would converge much before that.
5. Malware data
In this paper we analyse drive-by download malware.
In other words, malicious code downloaded uninten-
tionally to the user’s computer. In order to gather useful
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Figure 1: Cuckoo’s main architecture. The host runs the management
component while the guests run isolated Windows 8 environments.
Each environment safely executes a malware, analyses the results, and
then gets re-setted to its original (clean) state. Figure from [27].
data we need to release a malware sample in a safe en-
vironment, analyse the malware itself and keep track of
any changes it does to such environment. Luckily, there
are a number of options in terms of software we could
use to accomplish this. This type of software is com-
monly referred as malware sandbox, and it is used to
execute untrusted programs without risking the host ma-
chine (for details see [25, 26], and references therein).
Here we have chosen to use Cuckoo Sandbox 2.06 [27]
mainly because it is a free open-source solution, which
has been consistently used in research (see for instance
[28, 29, 30]). However, one should note that the signif-
icance of this choice is rather low as our method does
not depend on the sandbox in use (see Section 4). All
we need is data describing the malware to be analysed.
Hence, one can use any malware sandbox capable of
fulfilling this requirement.
Cuckoo runs at host-level and manages one or more
Windows 8 VM guests (see Figure 1 for a visual repre-
sentation). The latter is an isolated environment allow-
ing Cuckoo to gather behavioural data (eg. API calls
made by the malware, dropped files, processes spawned,
etc.). Cuckoo resets this VM to its original (ie. clean)
state before each experiment with a potential malware.
This particular sandbox is also able to extract informa-
tion from files as part of its static analysis. For each
malware Cuckoo lists a number of features related to the
behaviour of the malware, as well as its static analysis.
In terms of raw data (ie. the malware samples them-
selves), we acquired a total of 2,000 samples from
VirusSign [31]. These malware samples were gathered
by VirusSign using HoneyPots, submissions, as well as
trading and exchange. Each and everyone of them was
confirmed by VirusSign to be malicious, using several
mainstream AntiVirus software. Each malware also pre-
sented features from Cuckoo’s behavioural and statical
analyses.
Given a list of features obtained with Cuckoo (see Ta-
ble 1), we can transform our data into an actual data ma-
trix. The process is quite straightforward. First we must
note we have two types of features: (i) binary features,
which represent the presence or absence of a particular
feature at a particular malware (eg. whether or not a
malware checks if the cursor is in use); (ii) numerical
features, which represent the number of times a partic-
ular feature was present at a particular malware (eg. the
number of times a malware sent ICMP messages). We
have 2,000 samples with 67 features meaning that any
given malware sample xi in our data set X is described
over 67 features (ie. n = 2, 000 and d = 67).
6. Clustering results
We began by applying classical normalisation (see
Section 3) to the data set we constructed (for details
on the data set, see Section 5). Figure 2a shows the
plot of our data over its first and second principal com-
ponents. Unfortunately, there is no clear evidence of a
cluster structure from a Gaussian perspective (ie. clearly
separable round clusters).
As popular as it may be, a clustering algorithm such
as k-means++ will identify clusters even if there is no
cluster structure in a data set. Hence, one should not
just jump into applying this algorithm to the data. To il-
lustrate this, we applied k-means++ to our data set 100
times. Figure2b shows the clustering we obtained with
the lowest criterion output by setting k = 7 (given this
is just illustrative, the actual value of k matters very lit-
tle). The fact this clustering is meaningless is further
reinforced by an average silhouette index of 0.39.
The results we obtained using our icdfr method are
certainly more promising. In these experiments we set
the imwk-means’ thereshold θ = 3. We did so to avoid
very small clusters in our results, which would not be of
particular interest (this choice ended up leading to seven
clusters, hence the number of clusters in our illustrative
k-means++ example). The first and second steps of our
method (described in Section 4) use consensus cluster-
ing in order to identify a suitable Minkowski exponent
p between 1.1 and 5.0 — higher values of p tend to
remove the advantages of feature weighting as (6) will
produce more uniform weights. In this experiment the
optimal value was found to be p = 3.9. Given this value
of p we set the number of iterations to 100 and allowed
our method to follow Steps 3-5. We were happy to see
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Table 1: The list of features identified by Cuckoo in the malware samples we obtained from VirusSign. In the features description a ‘#’ means
‘number of’, implying the feature is numerical, all other features are binary. ‘PE’ means Portable Executable.
Name Description Name Description
ICMP # ICMP messages AllocateVMem # calls to NtAllocateVirtualMemory
AntiDebug Use of debugging techniques Bind # calls to bind
CheckCursor Whether a cursor is in use CloseSocket # calls to closesocket
CreateFile # calls to NtCreateFile CreateMutant # calls to NtCreateMutant
CryptographyReg Access to Cryptography registry CustomLocaleReg Access to CustomLocale registry
DelayExe Call to NtDelayExecution DeviceIO Use of DeviceIOControl
DroppedFiles # files dropped FindFile # calls used to locate files
FreeVMem # calls to NtFreeVirtualMemory GetSysTime Use of GetSystemTimeAsFileTime
HttpOpenReq # calls to HttpOpenRequest HttpSendReq # calls to HttpSendRequest
IE Access to IE registry MapView # calls to NtMapViewOfSection
OpenFile # calls to NtOpenFile OpenMutant # calls to NtOpenMutant
ProcessNum # processes spawned ProtectVMem # calls to NtProtectVirtualMemory
QueryFile # queries for information about files RegCreate # calls to create registry keys
RegQuery # queries to the registry SafeBootReg Access to SafeBoot registry
Socket # calls to socket SortingReg Access to Nls/Sorting registry
TcpipReg Access to TCP/IP registry WriteFile # calls to NtWriteFile
IReadFile # calls to InternetReadFile ToolSS Use of CreateToolHelp32Snapshot
Dllsloaded # dlls loaded SysInfoRef Access to SystemInformation registry
CryptDecodeObjectX # calls to CryptDecodeObjectX Fips Access to FIPS algorithm policy
CryptCreateHash # calls to CryptCreateHash CryptHashData # calls to CryptHashData
DnscacheReg Access to DNSCache registry RegModify # calls to modify registry keys
DockingInfo Access to DockingState registry Persistence Access to persistence-related registry keys
SCManager Access to service control manager CryptExportKey # calls to CryptExportKey
CryptGenKey # calls to CryptGenKey AppInit Access to DLL-loading registry keys
CryptAcquireContextA # calls to CryptAcquireContextA RemoteThread Creation of remote threads.
Files Recreated # recreated files DuplicateProcess # call to duplicate process
NumSections # sections in PE file NumResources # resources in PE file
NumExports # exports in PE file TCP # tcp packets detected
UDP # udp packets detected HTTP # http packets detected
DroppedBuffers # dropped buffers Yara-embedded pe Detects embedded PE file
Yara-LnkHeader Detects lnk header DnscacheReg DnsCache registry modified
Yara-embedded win api Detects embedded win api Yara-shellcode Detects shellcode in file
Yara-vm detect Use VM detection techniques CheckDiskSize Call to CheckDiskSize function
Yara-embedded macho Detects Mach-o file
the method converged in iteration 53 — and even hap-
pier to see that the average silhouette of imwk-means
on the data set produced by our method was 0.92. The
new data set generated by our method also increased the
average silhouette of k-means++ to 0.52.
Figure 3 shows our method in action. Each of its sub-
figures (a to f ) shows the plot of a imwk-means cluster-
ing (over its first and second principal components) on
a data set generated by our method at a different (but in-
creasing) iteration. We can clearly see that our method
starts from a chaotic scenario and it quickly starts sepa-
rating clusters.
All of the above is very positive, but we need to en-
sure that our final clustering (ie. Figure 3f) is actually
meaningful in the real-world. In order to do this, we
analysed each cluster with the help of VirusTotal [32].
The latter is the most prominent online public service
with multiple anti-virus scanners [33]. Even with its
help, analysing our malware data is far from being a
trivial task. VirusTotal is capable of describing each
malware in our data set by employing the use of a num-
ber of AntiVirus (AV) software. However, this does not
mean that each and every AV will agree what a mal-
ware sample actually is (or even if the sample is really
a malware). Also, different AVs may have different tax-
onomies. Thus, even if two AVs agree what a malware
sample actually is, they may use different names.
Thanks to our analysis we can describe each cluster
as follows:
Cluster one: this cluster contains four malware sam-
ples, Figure 3f shows these in red. The AV labels for
these in VirusTotal seem to be quite different (using
names like adware and trojan, which are not mutually
exclusive), however, all four samples have exactly the
same compilation timestamp. This certainly suggests
these malware samples are very much related.
Cluster two: this cluster contains four malware sam-
ples, Figure 3f represents these in green. The vast ma-
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(a) Normalised data set.
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(b) The k-means++ clustering with the low-
est criterion output over 100 runs, with
seven clusters. This clustering has an av-
erage silhouette index of 0.39
Figure 2: The normalised malware data set plotted over its first and second principal components.
jority of AV’s in VirusTotal labels these as trickbot, a
trojan designed to steal banking information in partic-
ular. All the malware samples in this cluster share the
same import hash (imphash), which means they have
very similar import tables and are by consequence sim-
ilar.
Cluster three: this cluster contains 27 malware sam-
ples, Figure 3f represents these in blue. These mal-
ware samples can be easily characterised by the huge
amount of behaviour they exhibit while running in a Vir-
tual Machine, sometimes spawning over 100 processes.
According to VirusTotal, over 30 AVs (out of 60) label
most of the samples in this cluster as generic malware.
Around five AVs consistently label these malware sam-
ples with ransomware characteristics, while other five
AVs use the term flystudio (adware).
Cluster four: this cluster contains 14 malware sam-
ples, Figure 3f represents these in black. Eight of the
malware samples appear to be a specific type of trojan (a
downloader/installer). All but one of the malware sam-
ples has the same compilation timestamp, and share the
same imphash.
Cluster five: this cluster contains 14 malware sam-
ples, Figure 3f represents these in yellow. These mal-
ware samples have different imphashes but the AVs in
VirusTotal labels all of these samples as belonging to
the ransomware family GandCrab.
Cluster six: this cluster contains 79 malware samples,
Figure 3f represents these in magenta. Almost all mal-
ware samples in this cluster exhibit extremely similar
behaviour given they all share the same imphash value.
VirusTotal suggests these as adware in general, and AVs
classify them as being in the Adposhel or DNSUnlocker
families.
Cluster seven: this cluster contains 1,858 malware
samples, Figure 3f represents these in cyan. This is a
very large cluster for us to analyse each and every mal-
ware sample in VirusTotal. The malware samples in this
cluster seem to be associated with different families, but
also seem different from the malware samples in other
clusters.
The above shows there is a considerable difference
in cardinality between clusters, which is certainly ex-
pected. Malwares have a tendency to appear in bursts,
and their distribution is highly skewed [13]. Our method
will identify the most anomalous clusters first. Further
analysis could be done by applying our method solely to
the data in the largest cluster. We do not pursue this here
because we have already clearly achieved our aim. Tak-
ing the cluster’s descriptions above together with: (i) the
average silhouette of 0.92 given by imwk-means; (ii) the
increased average silhouette of k-means++ (from 0.39
to 0.52, the latter on the data set generated by icdf);
(iii) the mathematical model shown in Section 4, we can
state our method produces a data set which increases the
chances of a meaningful clustering.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we faced the problem of finding mean-
ingful clusters in drive-by-download malware data. The
patterns in this type of data can be difficult to identify,
particularly if using a distance based clustering algo-
rithm (see Figures 2a and 2b). We identified as the main
reason for this the fact that classical data normalisation
treats all features equally, instead of favouring those that
are more relevant.
In order to address the above, we introduced a
data pre-processing method called iterative cluster-
dependent feature rescaling (for details see Section 4).
This method makes use of cluster-dependent feature
weights to iteratively separate the clusters in a data set
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(f) Iteration 53
Figure 3: Clusterings generated by imwk-means on the data sets produced by our method, at each iteration. These figures show the separation of
clusters until the convergence of our method (iteration 53). In the last iteration the average silhouette index is of 0.92.
(see Figure 3). This mathematically sound method leads
to higher average silhouettes. For instance, k-means++
saw an increase from 0.39 to 0.52 when using our fea-
ture rescaling method, while imwk-means went as high
as 0.92. Hence, more meaningful clusters.
We foresee our method being used in the data pre-
processing stage of a malware clustering task, or per-
haps even in other clustering tasks. In the future we in-
tend to investigate the use of this method in supervised
classification problems.
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